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Abstract—Social dilemmas exist in various fields and give rise to the so-called free-riding problem, leading to collective fiascos. The
difficulty of tracking individual behaviors makes egoistic incentives in large-scale systems a challenging task. However, the
state-of-the-art mechanisms are either individual-based or state-dependent, resulting in low efficiency in large-scale networks. In this
paper, we propose an egoistic incentive mechanism from a connected (network) perspective rather than an isolated (individual)
perspective by taking advantage of the social nature of people. We make use of a zero-determinant (ZD) strategy for rewarding
cooperation and sanctioning defection. After proving cooperation is the dominant strategy for ZD players, we optimize their deployment
to facilitate cooperation over the whole system. To further speed up cooperation, we derive a ZD alliance strategy for sequential
multiple-player repeated games to empower ZD players with higher controllable leverage, which undoubtedly enriches the theoretical
system of ZD strategies and broadens their application domain. Our approach is stateless and stable, which contribute to its scalability.
Extensive simulations based on a real world trace data as well as synthetic data demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed
egoistic incentive approach under different networking scenarios.
Index Terms—Social dilemma, egoistic incentives, zero-determinant alliances.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
Many human decisions occur in situations where the re-
sults of one’s own decisions are interdependent with those
of others. Such interdependence situations tend to breed
social dilemmas, which has two traits: 1) each individual
who makes social defective choices gains higher profits no
matter what other individuals do; 2) comparing with the
situation where everyone cooperates, if everyone chooses to
defect, then all individuals get lower returns [1]. Therefore,
a social dilemma is essentially an inherent conflict between
defection and cooperation in a system where the former is
the dominant strategy for each individual but the latter can
maximize the overall social welfare.
Social dilemmas exist in various scenarios such as data
delivery in mobile opportunistic networks [2], file shar-
ing in peer-to-peer networks [3], and autonomous vehicle
programming [4]. A typical issue resulted from a social
dilemma is free-riding, an individually rational but socially
defecting choice which can lead to a collective fiasco. More-
over, such a tragedy of the commons would be aggravated as
the system expands because the behavior of an individual
becomes more difficult to track so that the influence on
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others diminishes [5]. Hence, there is a pressing need to
induce cooperation, especially in a large-scale system.
Cooperation in a social dilemma is often explained in
terms of egoistic incentives [6]. The state-of-the-art egoistic
incentive mechanisms realize their aims by transforming
a social dilemma game into one not involving a dilemma,
which can be categorized into two types: reputation-based
[3], [7]–[10] and pricing-based [11]–[14]. Reputation-based
schemes employ reputation or quasi-reputation to evaluate
a node’s contribution to others, based on which reacts to
its service requests, while pricing-based mechanisms treat
service provision as a transaction, taking advantage of mon-
etary incentives to stimulate cooperation.
Existing incentive mechanisms have two common traits:
they all are individual-based and involve state (reputation or
transaction status) maintenance and management. The first trait
comes from the underlying concept in which the success
of cooperation inducement to each individual inevitably re-
sults in that of the whole system. Such a case-by-case based
approach is obviously inefficient as the size of the system
enlarges. The second trait exists due to the state-dependent
nature of the state-of-the-art methods. Regretfully, the cost
of maintaining and managing states would soar in a large-
scale system.
In this paper, we realize large-scale egoistic incentives
from the perspective of the network rather than an individ-
ual. Our idea stems from the following observation: each
person in this world is more or less socially connected to
others, forming a so-called social community. Within such
an environment, cooperation and competition among all
members jointly determine the utility of an individual. Since
each individual is utility-driven, cooperation inducement
requires us to analyze the game among all players in the
social community, which involves the structure of their
social ties. Hence, it is reasonable to consider incentives
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2from the connected (network) perspective rather than the
isolated (individual) perspective to stimulate cooperation.
Moreover, directly incentivizing the whole system has the
potential to bring high efficiency to a large-scale system.
Our egoistic incentive approach has two desired proper-
ties: statelessness and stability. These merits are obtained by
taking advantage of the zero-determinant (ZD) strategy [15]
whose adopter (the ZD player) can control its opponent’s
payoff in a unilateral way. Thus, through rewarding coop-
eration and negatively sanctioning defection, a ZD player
can stimulate cooperation of its co-players. After proving
cooperation is the dominant strategy of the ZD players, we
optimize their deployment, facilitating cooperation over the
whole system. Our method is stateless because it does not
need to manage or maintain any state; it is stable since
the deployment of the ZD players only depends on the
social ties among the players, which are usually steady. The
statelessness and stability contribute to the sound scalability
of our egoistic incentive.
Another contribution of this paper is the derivation of a
ZD alliance strategy for sequential multiple-player repeated
games, where a ZD alliance refers to a group of players
taking the same ZD strategy. Such a derivation brings two
benefits. First, the alliance strategy widens the range of a
co-player’s utility that ZD players can set, implying that
ZD players can achieve higher controllable leverage through
allying. The increased controlling power of a ZD alliance
breeds an environment where cooperation thrives. Second,
our derivation enriches the theoretical system of ZD strate-
gies, broadening their application domain.
We conduct extensive simulations based on real-world
trace data as well as synthetic data, which represent differ-
ent types of typical network topologies including star, ring,
tree, and mesh structures. These simulation results demon-
strate the effectiveness of our egoistic incentive approach.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The most
related work is investigated in Section 2. Section 3 presents
our problem formulation. The ZD alliance strategy for a
sequential multiple-player repeated game is deduced in Sec-
tion 4, and our incentive algorithm is proposed in Section 5.
We report our simulation results on the proposed algorithm
in Section 6, and Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 RELATED WORK
Over the last two decades, research on cooperation induc-
tion has made considerable progress, which can be catego-
rized into two types: reputation-based and pricing-based.
Reputation-based methods employ the concept of rep-
utation or quasi-reputation to evaluate the behaviors of a
node based on its contributions to others, which is also a
criterion for reacting to the service requests of this node.
For example, in [7], relay nodes would get good reputation
values for their cooperation, which can build other nodes’
confidence on them thus helping forward their bundles. The
in-network realization of incentives was proposed in [8] to
attach an explicit ranking to a node in light of its transit
behaviors and translate the rank into message priority. Hu
et al. [3] proposed a budget-based self-optimized incentive
search protocol for unstructured P2P file sharing systems,
motivating selfish nodes to earn more credits by providing
services to others. As a game theoretical incentive, Multicent
[9] assigns credits for packet forwarding/storage in propor-
tional to the priorities specified in the routing strategy. The
concept of virtual credit was adopted in [10] to encourage
selfish nodes to cooperate in data forwarding.
Pricing-based methods take advantage of monetary in-
centives to stimulate cooperation. For instance, Ning et al.
[11] introduced the concept of virtual checks to pay the
cooperation of selfish nodes for ad dissemination in au-
tonomous mobile social networks. Chen et al. [12] proposed
an auction-based incentive mechanism for paid content of-
floading considering the dual identity of service providers.
Koutsopoulos [13] cast participatory sensing in the context
of optimal reverse auction design, offering reasonable pay-
ments for data contributors. Yang et al. [14] also proposed
an auction-based mechanism to incentivize participants of
mobile phone sensing while allowing users to have more
control over the payment they can receive.
Both reputation-based and pricing-based egoistic incen-
tives aim to shape the behaviors of individuals and involve
maintaining and managing the reputation or transaction
states, leading to low efficiency in a large-scale system.
In this paper, we take a dramatically different approach
from the perspective of a network rather than an individ-
ual to achieve good scalability by employing a ZD strat-
egy. ZD strategies [15] were firstly proposed by Press and
Dyson in 2012, providing us a revolutionary understanding
of simultaneous-move repeated games. ZD strategies can
enforce a fixed linear relationship between the expected
payoffs of two players, indicating that a ZD player can
control its opponent’s payoff in a unilateral way. Since ZD
strategies were proposed, several studies have been carried
out to enrich their theoretical hierarchy. For example, the
application of ZD strategies was extended from a two-player
simultaneous-move game to a multi-player one in [16]. The
concept of ZD alliance was first proposed in [5], whose
strategy was explored for simultaneous-move multi-player
games. In this paper, we employ a different theoretical ap-
proach to deduce the strategy of a ZD alliance for sequential
multi-player games to serve our problem scenario.
3 PROBLEM FORMULATION
To analyze the behaviors of the players from a network
perspective, we employ an indirect graph G = (V,E) to
describe a large-scale system, where V is the set of nodes
representing the players in the system and E is the set of
edges denoting the social ties of the players. Each player has
two choices in the game, namely cooperation c and defection
d. For example, in mobile opportunistic networks, c means
a player’s willingness to transmit data for others and d
implies rejecting relay services. Even though c and d have
different meanings in different scenarios, they own common
traits: the former is driven by social interests while the latter
involves that of an individual. In practice, an application
may involve multiple rounds and each player may choose c
or d within a round; and some players may move first while
the others take actions after observing the first movers.
As a result, we focus on a sequential repeated game with
multiple players in this paper.
3In any game, a rational player aims to maximize its
utility, which depends on not only the action of itself but
also those of others. In this paper, we adopt a method similar
to that in [5], [16] to calculate the utility Ui(ai|j) of a player
i when the number of cooperators among its neighbors is j:
Ui(ai|j) =
r(Ni)
(
j + ai
)
Ni + 1
+ (1− ai), ai ∈ {0, 1}, (1)
where ai = 1 means player i selects cooperation while
ai = 0 implies defection; Ni is the number of neighbors
of player i, and obviously 0 ≤ j ≤ Ni; and r(Ni) is the
profit proportional to Ni+1. We use r(Ni) = r in sequel for
simplicity.
Theorem 3.1. A social dilemma happens when r > 1.
Proof: According to [17], a social dilemma occurs
when the utility of each player possesses the following
properties: 1) a player, regardless its decision, can get a
higher utility when more co-players select cooperation; 2)
the utility of a defector is higher than that of a cooperator;
and 3) mutual cooperation outperforms mutual defection.
As a result, the following inequalities should be satisfied,
which are built based on the above three properties:
Ui(ai|j + 1) ≥ Ui(ai|j), 0 ≤ j ≤ Ni − 1,
Ui(0|j + 1) > Ui(1|j), 0 ≤ j ≤ Ni − 1,
Ui(1|Ni) > Ui(0|0).
According to (1), the first two inequalities obviously hold
without any constraint while for the last one, it is sufficient
that r > 1. Hence, the theorem is proved.
According to Theorem 3.1, a defector can obtain a higher
utility than a cooperator. However, once all players adopt
defection to act as free riders, each of which only gets the
utility of 1 according to (1), which is lower than the utility
of r when all players cooperate because r > 1, leading to
the tragedy of the commons. To deter free riders, a natural
idea is to teach players to get the cognition that cooperation
outperforms defection, synchronizing self-interest with the
common one. This requires an egoistic incentive by an
explicit side payment in the form of rewarding cooperation
while punishing defection. However, it is inefficient to em-
ploy centralized methods for the egoistic incentives espe-
cially in a large-scale system due to the lack of flexibility,
robustness, and the single point of failure issue. Hence, in this
paper, we resort to a distributed one.
To realize a distributed egoistic incentive, we take advan-
tage of ZD strategies [15]. A ZD player can set its opponent’s
payoff irrespective of what action the opponent would take.
Such capability is very valuable for shaping the behavior
of free riders. Hence, in this paper, we address the social
dilemma problem through the deployment of ZD players
forming an alliance in the network. We call players not
adopting the ZD strategy regular players. Then, as shown in
Fig. 1, in a network with heterogeneous players, the utility
U˜i of any regular player i may consist of two components:
the one obtained from the game playing with other regular
players and the other from playing with the ZD alliance.
The former game is called a regular game while the latter one
is called a ZD game. Particularly,
U˜i(ai|ni, nA) = Ui(ai|ni) + ui(ai|nA), ai ∈ {0, 1}. (2)
Fig. 1: Two types of games involving any regular player.
In (2), Ui(ai|ni) is the utility obtained from the regular
game when player i acts ai ∈ {0, 1} playing with ni cooper-
ators among the regular neighbors, which can be calculated
by (1); and ui(ai|nA) is the utility set by the ZD players
when player i acts ai ∈ {0, 1} and there are nA ZD players
as its neighbors.
Let the probability of a player choosing c or d be its
strategy. Being rational, a player chooses a strategy accord-
ing to the utility brought by cooperation or defection, which
is also affected by the co-players’ moves. Hence, we use the
following equation, similar to the one in [6], to determine
the strategy of player i at each round:
qi(c) =
eU˜i(1|ni,n
A)−U˜i(0|ni+1,nA)
1 + eU˜i(1|ni,nA)−U˜i(0|ni+1,nA)
. (3)
In (3), qi(c) is the probability that player i cooperates.
Obviously, the probability that player i defects is 1 − qi(c).
Here, qi(c) depends on the difference between U˜i(1|ni, nA)
and U˜i(0|ni + 1, nA), the utilities of player i adopting c
and d, respectively, when the number of regular cooperators
involving in the game is ni + 1 and there are nA ZD players
in the social community1. Note that both the number of
regular cooperators and that of ZD players can be obtained
according to historical information of games. As a result, our
optimization problem turns out to be the following: how to
deploy ZD players to maximize the overall cooperation probability
in the whole system, where each regular player’s cooperation
probability is calculated by (3)?
4 ZD ALLIANCE STRATEGY IN SEQUENTIAL
MULTIPLE-PLAYER REPEATED GAME
To solve our optimization problem, we need to determine
ui(ai|nA) in (2), the utility set by nA ZD players when
a regular player i acts ai ∈ {0, 1}. Note that for any
player i, there might exist more than one ZD players in
its neighborhood. In this case, multiple ZD players must
take the same action for the same move made by player
i because they should abide by consistent rules for being
fair-minded regulators in our approach. The ZD players
taking the same action form a ZD alliance. In this section,
we need to analyze how a ZD alliance sets the utility of
1. 1|ni means player i adopts cooperation when the number of other
players’ adopting c is ni and hence the total number of cooperators is
ni + 1 in this case.
4a regular player to determine ui(ai|nA). Particularly, when
nA = 1, a ZD alliance strategy regresses to a classical ZD
strategy. Note that, the original or variant ZD strategies [5],
[15], [16] are only applicable to simultaneous-move repeated
games with two or more players, which are not suitable for
our scenario. Hence, we first extend the application domain
of ZD strategies for a sequential multiple-player repeated
game.
In a sequential multiple-player repeated game, players
are classified into two types: the first-move players and
the second-move ones. We call them leaders and followers
respectively in this paper. No matter which type a player
belongs to, its utility is calculated according to (1), which is
affected by the co-players’ moves. Because a leader has to
move first, its strategy is made based on all players’ actions
in the previous round. Let pi be the strategy of leader i. We
have
pi = (pic,nL−1,N−nL , · · · , pic,nL−1,0, · · · , pic,0,0,
pid,nL−1,N−nL , · · · , pid,nL−1,0, · · · , pid,0,0),
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , nL},
(4)
where each element can be represented in the form of pisi,x,y ,
the probability of leader i choosing c given that it played
si ∈ {c, d} previously and the numbers of cooperators
among other leaders and followers were respectively x and
y in the previous round; and nL and N are respectively the
numbers of leaders and all players in this game.
Since a follower can observe the behavior of the leaders
in the current round, its strategy depends on the leaders’
moves. Let qj be the strategy of follower j, which can be
represented as
qj = (qjnL , q
j
nL−1, · · · , qj0), j ∈ {nL+1, nL+2, . . . , N}, (5)
where each element can be written in the form of qjz ,
the probability of follower j choosing c when there are z
cooperators among the leaders.
With the definitions of pi and qj , i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , nL} and
j ∈ {nL+ 1, nL+ 2, . . . , N}, we can construct the following
Markov matrix
M = [Mvw]2N×2N ,
where each element Mvw denotes the one-step transition
probability from state v to w. Here, a state denotes the
moves made by all players in this round. The state transition
probability is essentially a joint one that can be obtained by
Mvw =
nL∏
i=1
αi
N∏
j=nL+1
βj ,
in which αi and βj respectively denote the probabilities of
actions made by leader i and follower j in state w and they
can be calculated as
αi = (p
i
si,x,y)
ai(1− pisi,x,y)1−ai (6)
and
βj = (q
j
z)
aj (1− qjz)1−aj . (7)
In (6), pisi,x,y also denotes the probability of leader i
cooperating when it played si ∈ {c, d} and the numbers
of cooperators among other leaders and followers were re-
spectively x and y in the last round (state v); and ai ∈ {0, 1}
is the action of leader i made in state w. In (7), qjz is also
the cooperation probability of follower j when there are z
cooperators among the leaders in state w and aj ∈ {0, 1} is
its action in state w.
Define a matrix M′ = M − I, where I is the unitary
matrix. Let v be the stable vector of the transition matrix
M; then we have vTM = vT; hence vTM′ = 0. Denote
[M1,M2, . . . ,Mm, . . . ,M2N ] by M′, where Mi is the ith
column vector. In light of Cramer’s rule, Adj(M′)M′ =
det(M′)I = 0, where Adj(M′) is the adjugate matrix of M′.
Combining this equation with vTM′ = 0, we know that
v is proportional to each row of Adj(M′) [5]. Therefore,
the dot product of the stable vector v and any vector
f = (f1, f2, · · · , f2N−1, f2N ) is
v · f = det [M1,M2, . . . ,Mm, . . . ,M2N−1, f ].
Now we apply an elementary column transformation
to [M1,M2, . . . ,Mm, . . . ,M2N−1, f ]: find a column corre-
sponding to a state where only one leader cooperates (i.e.,
the element of that column is in the form of pisi,x,y
∏
j 6=i(1−
pjsj ,x,y)
∏
k(1 − qk1 ), i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , nL}, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , nL},
k ∈ {nL + 1, nL + 2, . . . , N}) and a set of columns (de-
noted as Θ) corresponding to the states where player i
and at least one co-player cooperates (i.e., each element
of those columns is represented as pisi,x,y
∏
j 6=i αj
∏
k βk,
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , nL}, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , nL}, k ∈ {nL + 1, nL +
2, . . . , N}, ∃j, aj = 1 ∨ ∃k, ak = 1); then add all columns
in Θ to the first column we found to form a new column
whose element is pisi,x,yT − 1 if a diagonal element of M′
is added to this entry and otherwise is pisi,x,yT , where
T = ∏j 6=i(1 − pjsj ,x,y)∏k(1 − qk1 ) + ∑Θ∏j 6=i αj∏k βk.
Obviously, T = 1.
After the elementary column transformation, the matrix
[M1,M2, . . . ,Mm, . . . ,M2N−1, f ] has a new form, i.e.,
[M1,M2, . . . ,M
′
m, . . . ,M2N−1, f ],
whereM ′m is the new column formed according to the above
method. More specifically,
[M1,M2, . . . ,M
′
m, . . . ,M2N−1, f ]
=

· · · pisi,x,y − 1 · · · f1· · · pisi,x,y − 1 · · · f2
. . .
...
. . .
...
· · · pisi,x,y · · · f2N−1· · · pisi,x,y · · · f2N
 .
(8)
It is worthy of noting that the new column can be located
at any place of the original [M1,M2, . . . ,Mm, . . . ,M2N−1, f ]
indicating a state where only one leader cooperates. Here,
we assume leader i is such a player, and the corresponding
column is located at the mth position. Notably, the mth
column in (8) is only related to the strategy of leader i,
denoted as
p˜ = (pisi,x,y − 1, pisi,x,y − 1, · · · , pisi,x,y, pisi,x,y).
If we let p˜ = φf , where φ 6= 0 is a coefficient, the mth
column is proportional to the last one, resulting in
v · f = 0. (9)
5To set a suitable f , we divide the players in the game into
two groups : alliance members (A) and non-alliance members
(−A), with the former being a subset of the leaders taking
the same strategy as leader i while the latter including the
rest of the leaders and all followers. Let vectors gA = (gAs,b)
and g−A = (g−As,b ) be respectively the average payoffs of
alliance members and the non-alliance members under all
possible outcomes, where each element gAs,b (g
−A
s,b ) is the
average payoff of a member from the set A (−A) when
the alliance adopts s ∈ {c, d} and there are b cooperators
in total. Denote by nA the number of alliance members.
According to (1), we have
gAc,b =
rb
N , n
A ≤ b ≤ N,
gAd,b =
rb
N + 1, 0 ≤ b ≤ N − nA,
g−Ac,b =
(b−nA) rbN +(N−b)( rbN +1)
N−nA , n
A ≤ b ≤ N,
g−Ad,b =
b rbN +(N−nA−b)( rbN +1)
N−nA , 0 ≤ b ≤ N − nA.
(10)
In (10), all alliance members have the same utility be-
cause their behaviors are the same. This is different from
the non-alliance members whose utilities depend on not
only their actions but also the number of cooperators and
defectors from both sets of A and −A.
Based on the above analysis, one can set
f = χ(gA − l · 1)− (g−A − l · 1),
where χ and l are coefficients, and 1 is a vector with each
element being 1. Let p˜ = φf = φ[χ(gA−l ·1)−(g−A−l ·1)].
According to (9), we have
v · f = v · (χ(gA − l · 1)− (g−A − l · 1))
= χ(v · gA − l · v · 1)− (v · g−A − l · v · 1)
= χ(piA − l)− (pi−A − l) = 0. (11)
In (11), piA and pi−A are respectively the expected utili-
ties of alliance members and non-alliance members. Recall
that v is the stable vector of the transition matrix; hence
v · gA = piA, v · g−A = pi−A and v · 1 = 1. Obviously, (11)
shows that when leader i sets its strategy to p˜, it can enforce
a linear relationship between piA and pi−A, i.e.,
pi−A = χpiA + (1− χ)l, (12)
which means that leader i acts as a ZD player in this
situation. Since leader i is a member of the alliance and all
alliance members should take the same action, this alliance
takes a ZD strategy and is termed a ZD alliance. We call the
non-ZD alliance members outsiders. Then, when χ = 0, the
ZD alliance can set the expected utility of the outsiders with
pi−A = l.
Theorem 4.1. When r−12r N < n
A ≤ r−1r N , the expected
utility of the outsiders satisfies r(N−n
A)
N ≤ pi−A ≤ rn
A
N +
1.
Proof: According to (12), if χ 6= 1, l = pi−A−χpiA1−χ ,
which is proportional to −piA and pi−A. Because the ZD
alliance moves first, we start by analyzing the range of l
from piA. Given that there are b cooperators, according to
the nature of social dilemma, we have
gAc,b =
rb
N
≤ piA ≤ gAd,b =
rb
N
+ 1. (13)
In other words, the expected utility of the ZD alliance
is higher when it defects rather than cooperates. When the
ZD alliance defects, the average utility of the outsiders
is g−Ad,b =
b rbN +(N−nA−b)( rbN +1)
N−nA ; otherwise, it is g
−A
c,b =
(b−nA) rbN +(N−b)( rbN +1)
N−nA . Combining the range of pi
A given in
(13), we can deduce
max
0≤b≤N−nA
{ ϑ · b
N(N − nA)(1− χ) + 1}
≤ l ≤ min
nA≤b≤N
{ ϑ · b+N
2
N(N − nA)(1− χ)},
where ϑ = r(N − nA)(1 − χ) − N . When r−12r N < nA ≤
r−1
r N and χ = 0, we can obtain the expected utility range
of the outsiders.
According to Theorem 4.1, when nA = 1, which implies
that there is only one ZD alliance member, the controllable
range of pi−A shrinks to [ r(N−1)N ,
r
N + 1]. This demonstrates
that a ZD alliance can obtain higher regulation leverage
compared to a single ZD player.
We use an example shown in Fig. 2 to explain key terms
and definitions involved in this section. Assume that there
are three players in the game, among which players 1 and 2
are the leaders while player 3 is the follower. The states of
the game include all possible outcomes, namely
{ccc, ccd, cdc, cdd, dcc, dcd, ddc, ddd}.
Accordingly, the utility of any player in each outcome can
be calculated according to (1).
The strategy of each leader and the follower can be
represented in light of (4) and (5). For instance, given a
previous outcome cdc, the conditional probability under
which player 1 adopts c in the current round is p1c,0,1 because
it acted c and there was no other cooperative leader but one
cooperative follower in the previous round; similarly, player
2 adopts c with the conditional probability of p2d,1,1 in the
current round since it acted d and both the remaining leader
and the follower cooperated in the previous round; player 3
is a follower, whose strategy space’s cardinality reduces to
nL+1, which is much lower than that of any leader (i.e., 2N ).
The conditional probability of player 3 adopting c is q3z , de-
pending on the number (z) of cooperators among the leaders
in the current round. As a result, the probability from state
cdc to any other state can be derived. For example, the
transition probability to state ddc is (1−p1c,0,1)(1−p2d,1,1)q30 .
All state transition probabilities contribute to the transition
matrix M. Let M′ = M− I, which can be denoted as
[M1,M2,M3,M4,M5,M6,M7,M8].
Next, we perform an elementary column transformation
on matrix [M1,M2,M3,M4,M5,M6,M7, f ], identifying a
column corresponding to a state where only one leader
cooperates (e.g., player 1) and adding to it all the other
columns whose states indicate that player 1 cooperates and
at least one of players 2 and 3 also selects c. The determinant
after the elementary column transformation becomes
[M1,M2,M3,M
′
4,M5,M6,M7, f ],
where the fourth column, denoted by the red color in Fig.
2, is formed according to the above method. We can find
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Fig. 2: An example sequential three-player repeated game.
that M ′4 is only dependent on the strategy of player 1. If we
apply an elementary column transformation corresponding
to player 2, we can obtain the sixth column (denoted by the
blue color in Fig. 2) that only relies on player 2.
Let player 1 be the ZD player and ally with player 2. Both
can set their strategies as p1 = p2 = φ[χ(gA−l ·1)−(g−A−
l ·1)], where gA = [gAc,2, gAc,3, gAd,0, gAd,1] = [2r3 , r, 1, r3 +1] and
g−A = [g−Ac,2 , g
−A
c,3 , g
−A
d,0 , g
−A
d,1 ] = [
2r
3 + 1, r, 1,
r
3 ]. According
to Theorem 4.1, the ZD alliance including players 1 and 2
can set the expected utility of player 3 ranging from r3 to
2r
3 + 1.
Now, it is the time to answer the question proposed at
the beginning of this section. Taking advantage of Theorem
4.1, we can set
ui(ai|nA) =
{
rnA
N + 1, ai = 1,
r(N−nA)
N , ai = 0,
(14)
which means a ZD alliance would reward the cooperation of
the outsiders with the highest expected utility while punish
their defection with the lowest utility. This extreme reward-
punishment incentive mechanism can help to facilitate co-
operation as much as possible.
5 ZD ALLIANCE FOR EGOISTIC INCENTIVE
Based on our analysis in Section 3, one can see that a rational
player i would take an action according to the difference
between the utilities of adopting c and d, which are related
to the co-players’ moves among its social community. Due
to the heterogeneous nature of the members in the social
community, the utility of player i may come from the
regular game and the ZD game, with the former being
calculated by (1) while the latter solved by (14). Note that
Theorem 4.1 in Section 4 can serve for a more general case,
where the number of outsiders is arbitrary. However, in our
consideration, for any player i, the corresponding ZD game
only involves the ZD alliance and the player itself as shown
in Fig. 1, implying that the outsider is just player i and hence
we have N − nA = 1.
From the perspective of a single player, one can realize
egoistic incentives by rewarding more expected utility when
the player chooses c and punishing it if it defects. However,
to achieve this goal from the network perspective, we need
to optimize the deployment of ZD players so that the
overall cooperation probability in the whole system can be
maximized.
To optimize the above problem, we need to answer such
a question: according to (12), pi
A−l
pi−A−l =
1
χ , implying that
a ZD alliance has the ability to carry out the extortionate
strategy by enforcing a ratio between its expected utility
and that of the outsider. Moreover, the smaller the χ, the
more the expected utility that can be transferred to the
ZD alliance. In this case, as a dominant player, can the
ZD alliance push the outsider to cooperate while it intends
to defect for obtaining more expected utility? We use the
following theorem to answer this question:
Theorem 5.1. The dominant strategy of the ZD alliance is
cooperation irrespective of the strategy adopted by the
outsider.
Proof: In the ZD game, when player i takes ai ∈
{0, 1}, the utilities of the ZD alliance when it cooperates
and defects are respectively r(n
A+ai)
N and
rai
N + 1 according
to (10). To prove cooperation is the dominant strategy of the
ZD alliance, we should prove r(n
A+ai)
N >
rai
N + 1, which is
equivalent to proving (r − 1)nA > 1 due to N − nA = 1 in
our scenario.
In light of Theorem 4.1, the condition under which a ZD
alliance can control others is r−12r N < n
A ≤ r−1r N , which
can be simplified as r > N due to N − nA = 1. Because
N ≥ 2, we have (r−1)nA > 1. As a conclusion, this theorem
holds.
When cooperation is the dominant strategy of the ZD
alliance, maximizing the overall cooperation probability of
7the whole system is equivalent to maximizing those of all
regular players. Hence, our optimization problem can be
written as:
max
V∑
i=1
qi(c)xi,
s.t.
∑
xi = V −K,
xi ∈ {0, 1},
(15)
where xi = 0 denotes that player i adopts the ZD strategy
and xi = 1 means that the player is a regular one; and K
and V are respectively the number of ZD players we deploy
and the number of total players in the system.
To find an optimal solution for (15), we resort to genetic
algorithms (GA) because GA is efficient in dealing with
problems with nonlinear and multi-constraint properties. As
GA has been well-studied, we refer the interested readers to
[18] and omit the algorithm description here.
The basic idea of our egoistic incentive mechanism is to
take advantage of the ZD alliance to shape the behaviors
of the regular players. According to (3), the cooperation
probability of a regular player i depends on the number
of ZD players (nA) and that of cooperators (ni) among
the regular neighbors in its social community. However,
due to the nature of social dilemma [17], we can obtain
Ui(1|ni) − Ui(0|ni + 1) = r(ni+1)N˜ − (
r(ni+1)
N˜
+ 1) = −1,
where N˜ is the total number of regular players in the
social community. This equation reflects that a player i can
definitely obtain a higher payoff if it defects rather than
cooperates, no matter how many cooperators there exist
(i.e., ni) in its neighborhood. This makes the strategy of
a regular player i only relies on nA, the number of ZD
players around i. While nA is determined by the solution
of the optimization problem (15), which is closely related to
the topology of network G. Because G is constructed based
on the nodes’ social ties, which are relatively steady, nA is
steady. Hence, our method is stable, and does not need to
maintain and manage any state; thus achieving the property
of statelessness introduced in Section 1.
6 PERFORMANCE SIMULATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our proposed
mechanism using real and synthetic data.
The real data we adopt is the iMote data [19], including
traces of Bluetooth sightings by groups of users carrying
small devices (iMotes) for a number of days in different
offices, conferences, and cities. We use all iMote nodes (54
in total) and their links to perform our simulation. Synthetic
data is also employed since we want to test the performance
of our approach under different network topologies. The
types of networks in our simulation are star, ring, tree, and
mesh, each of which includes 80 nodes. More specifically,
all nodes in the star network are individually connected to
a central node; in the ring network, each node connects to
exactly two other nodes, forming a closed loop; each node
has two neighbors except the leaf nodes in the tree network,
making its shape a binary tree; and in the mesh network,
each node has at least two randomly selected neighbors.
All simulations have been repeated 30 times to obtain the
average values with statistical confidence.
Fig. 3 demonstrates how the average cooperation prob-
ability of our mechanism changes with the number of ZD
players (K) deployed in different networks. In this study,
we set r = 2n + 3, where n is the total number of players
in a game. Note that each regular player may involve in
two kinds of games, the regular game and the ZD game
as shown in Fig. 1. Hence, n varies in different games.
According to Fig. 3, one can see that the mesh network
has the best performance, realizing fast cooperation over
the whole system using fewer ZD players. Although the
performance of the real network is slightly lower than that
of the mesh network, both have similar trends. This is
because compared to other networks, the nodes in these two
networks have higher degrees; thus fewer ZD players are
needed to control more regular players.
Fig. 3 also shows that in the star network, once a ZD
player is deployed, the average cooperation probability can
rocket to 73% and keep this level even though the number
of ZD players increases. The reason behind this lies in that
each node has only one neighbor except the central node in
the star network, and a single ZD player is definitely needed
in the central position to control all the other nodes while
other ZD players completely lose their control power due to
the lack of connections to other regular players. However,
because of only one ZD player functions, the controllable
range of the outsider’s expected utility shrinks to [ r2 ,
r
2 + 1],
making the cooperation probability to be e1+e ≈ 73%. This
is different from the situations in the mesh network and the
real network, where ZD players can achieve higher control
leverage by forming alliances and finally obtain the desired
cooperation probabilities.
Finally, one can see from Fig. 3 that the growth rates of
cooperation probabilities in the tree and the ring networks
are the slowest. This is because the average degrees in the
tree and ring networks are respectively 1.95 and 2, which are
about 120 and
1
10 of those in the mesh and the real networks.
Although the tree and ring networks have almost the same
average degree as the star network, the ZD player located at
the central place in the star network has the largest degree
value, empowering its control.
Fig. 4 illustrates the average cooperation probabilities of
our method under different numbers of ZD players (K)
deployed in different networks when r = 2n2 + 3, which
implies a nonlinear relationship between r and n. According
to this figure, one can see that the results are similar to
those shown in Fig. 4. Note that we have done extensive
simulations under other forms of r(n) and obtained results
with very similar trends; hence the corresponding results
are omitted in this paper to avoid redundancy.
Figs. 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 further demonstrate the perfor-
mance of the proposed egoistic incentive mechanism for the
mesh, real, star, tree, and ring networks, respectively, when
r = fn + 3, where f is a coefficient. The subfigures (a)
indicate the ratio of cooperators varying with f and the
number of ZD players K in different networks while all
subfigures (b) show the optimal deployments of ZD players
in the corresponding networks when f = 2 and K = 10.
The red lines in the subfigures (b) identify the social ties
(edges) of the ZD players.
We can clearly observe that the emergence of cooperation
phenomenon happens in the mesh network from Fig. 5(a).
80 5 10 15 20 25 30−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
Av
er
ag
e 
co
op
er
at
io
n 
pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
 
 
Number of ZD players
star
mesh
ring
tree
real 40 50 60 70
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Number of ZD players
Av
er
ag
e 
co
op
er
at
io
n 
pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
 
 
ring
tree
Fig. 3: Average cooperation probabilities in different net-
works when r = 2n+ 3.
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Fig. 4: Average cooperation probability in different networks
when r = 2n2 + 3.
That is, a large number of cooperators arise after more
than 3 ZD players are deployed. When the number of ZD
players is higher than 5, almost all regular players choose to
cooperate. Fig. 5(b) indicates the positions of 10 ZD players.
The statistical data reveals that these ZD players are popular
nodes because their average degree is 51.7, compared to 39,
the average degree of all nodes in the mesh network.
Fig. 6(a) demonstrates that the real network has simi-
lar performance as the mesh network. However, a further
analysis on Fig. 6(b) indicates that the ZD players are not
hot spots since their average degree is 16.8, which is lower
than that of the whole network, i.e., 21.8. Contrarily, the
ZD strategy is adopted by the nodes with high betweenness
whose average value is 67.8888, almost twice as much as
the average betweenness of the whole system. Here, the
betweenness of a node is defined as the total number of
times a node acts as a relay along the shortest path between
any two other nodes. The reason behind this phenomenon
may lie in that there exist sparse subnetworks in the real
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Fig. 5: Performance in the mesh network.
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Fig. 6: Performance in the real network.
network that cannot be controlled by the popular nodes
but can be regulated by nodes with a high betweenness
value because betweenness can be employed to evaluate a
node’s contribution to the network connectivity, quantifying
to what extent this node can impact on others.
Fig. 7(a) indicates that there still exists an emergence
of cooperation in the star network after deploying one ZD
player. Just as we have expected, this ZD player is located
at the central place indicated in Fig. 7(b), which has the
highest popularity as well as connectivity. As we have
analyzed earlier, even though we put more ZD players in
other positions, they would not function since there exist no
regular players as their neighbors, leading to low regulation
power because no ZD alliance can be formed in this case.
Hence, we just label the position of the single ZD player in
Fig. 7(b).
According to Fig. 8(a), there is no emergence of cooper-
ation phenomenon in the tree network. Moreover, the ratio
of cooperators in the network rises steadily and relatively
slowly due to the low average degree of the tree network.
From subfigure (b), one can see that all ZD players are
deployed in the nodes with degree being 3, higher than
the root node and the leaf nodes whose degree values are
respectively 2 and 1. Higher popularity makes ZD players
possess more regular players as their neighbors, increasing
their regulation range.
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Fig. 7: Performance in the star network.
0
20
40
60
2
4
6
8
10
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Kf
P
ro
po
rti
on
 o
f c
oo
pe
ra
tio
n
(a) Cooperator ratio
65 66
33
16
32
68
6764
178
34
71
7035
69
73
7437
18
36
76
75
72
19
9
38
7778
3979
20
80
43 40
10 41
2142
26
27
54
55 13
53
25
52
6
50
49
51
2412
48
7
61
62
15
31
63
30
60
45
47
2346
22
11
44
58 28
29 14
57
59
56
4
1
3
5
2
(b) ZD deployment
Fig. 8: Performance in the tree network.
Fig. 9(a) demonstrates that the performance of our mech-
anism in the ring network is similar to that in the tree
network: no emergence of cooperation and low growth
ratio of the number of cooperators. However, there exists
a difference between them if we compare Fig. 8(a) with Fig.
9(a). Specifically, when the number of ZD players is smaller
than 30, the tree network outperforms the ring network; but
when there are more than 30 ZD players deployed, the ring
network wins. The underlying reason can be found from
Fig. 8(b) and Fig. 9(b). The cause of the first phenomenon
lies in that each ZD player in the tree network has a degree
of 3, which is higher than 2, the degree of a ZD player in
the ring network; the second phenomenon happens because
ZD alliances can be formed more easily in the ring network
than in the tree network and when the number of ZD
players increases, the power of ZD alliance can stimulate
more cooperation. For example, as indicated by Fig.8(b) and
Fig. 9(b), when 10 ZD players are deployed to shape the
behaviors of others, no ZD alliance exists in the tree network
while several ZD alliances are formed in the ring network.
For instance, in the ring network, node 35 can ally with not
only node 33 to regulate node 34, but also node 37 to control
node 36.
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Fig. 9: Performance in the ring network.
7 CONCLUSION
This paper proposes a mechanism to realize large-scale
egoistic incentives via optimally deploying ZD players to
reward cooperation and punish defection. We further de-
rive a ZD alliance strategy for sequential multiple-player
repeated games to speed up cooperation. Our approach has
the traits of statelessness and stability, making it scalable
and suitable for large-scale systems. The simulation results
demonstrate that mesh and real networks can achieve the
best performance where the emergence of cooperation phe-
nomenon happens when only a few ZD players are de-
ployed. Although such phenomenon also exists in a star
network, its topological trait makes only one ZD player
function, pinning the cooperation probability to be 73%.
The tree and ring networks perform the worst due to a low
average degree. However, compared to the tree network,
ZD alliances are more easily formed in the ring network,
making it perform better as the number of ZD players
increases.
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